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THE USE OF THE FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX SYSTEM TO COMBAT AIR AND 
WATER POLLUTION: A CASE STUDY 
IN TAX EXPENDITURES 
By Paul R. McDanier:' and .dIan S. Kaplinskf:":' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the past few years there has been a proliferation in the 
number of proposed methods of providing financial assistance for 
combatting air and water pollution. Included are proposals for 
direct federal grants/ federal low-interest loans,2 efHuent fees,3 
and special financing techniques for municipal treatment facili-
ties4 and river basin authorities.6 There have also been many 
suggestions that the federal income tax system be utilized to aid 
antipollution efforts. These proposals usually take the form of 
allowing a special deduction6 or a tax credie for investment in 
qualified pollution control equipment. Since World War II more 
than 80 tax bills have been introduced into Congress to encourage 
investment in pollution control equipment.s 
Tax measures specifically for antipollution efforts had their 
genesis in the federal income tax laws in 1966 with the suspension 
of the seven percent investment credit. At that time an exception 
was made continuing the credit during the suspension period for 
pollution control facilities. 9 In 1968, bonds for pollution control 
facilities were granted an exception to the repeal of the tax 
exempt status of industrial development bonds.1o Most recently, 
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 included a provision allowing a tax-
payer to amortize over a five year period a portion of the cost of 
its investment in qualified pollution control facilities.u 
This article will examine the considerations involved in using 
the federal income tax system to encourage efforts to control 
environmental pollution through an analysis of the five year 
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rapid amortization provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 
Section 169 of the Internal Revenue Code. Financial assistance 
through the tax mechanism is an alternative to other forms of 
direct federal aid. As such, the new tax provision must be com-
pared to these alternatives-direct grants, low cost loans, and the 
like-as to equity, efficiency, and effectiveness. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 169 
When President Nixon recommended repeal of the seven 
percent investment tax credit in April, 1969/2 testimony by 
private industry representatives before the House Ways and 
Means Committee suggested that an exception be made for 
pollution abatement facilities. 13 It was argued that if an excep-
tion were not carved out for pollution control facilities, many 
industries would find it extremely difficult to comply with 
federal, state, and local regulations governing air and water 
pollutionY Industry representatives pointed out that pollution 
control facilities do not increase earnings, improve competitive 
position, expand production, or cut costS.15 They further asserted 
that investment in pollution control facilities serves only a social 
purpose and that the public should thus share part of the cost of 
the investment.16 Some witnesses even suggested that the invest-
ment tax credit should be increased above the seven percent 
rateY 
The Treasury18 and the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare (HEW)19 opposed any exception to preserve the invest-
ment credit for antipollution devices. The Treasury feared that 
opening the door to an exception for pollution abatement 
facilities would invite other exceptions, and thus erode the 
effectiveness of repeal of the investment credit as an anti-in-
flationary measure. 
Former Secretary Finch of HEW, in a letter to the House Ways 
and Means Committee, argued that the tax credit would not be 
an effective stimulus to pollution abatement.2o From the stand-
point of private industry, since the necessary equipment yields 
little or no return, alternative uses of funds would be economically 
more attractive even with the seven percent tax credit. Hence any 
"incentive" effect of a tax preference was doubtful. Further, 
Secretary Finch argued, the prime incentive for industry to en-
gage in pollution abatement efforts arises from state and local reg-
ulatory requirements. Thus, the tax credit would constitute a 
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windfall, rewarding businesses for doin~ what they would have 
to do in any event. Under this analysIs, Secretary Finch con-
cluded that the proposal to provide an investment credit for 
pollution control facilities simply amounted to cost-sharing 
by the federal government. As such, the tax cost-sharing ap-
proach had to be evaluated like any other proposed federal aid 
to private business from the standpoint of need, efficiency, and 
effecti veness. 
Secretary Finch pointed out that the cost to industry of effec-
tive pollution control is quite small. A 1967 report by an inter-
agency Working Committee on Economic Incentives entitled 
"Cost Sharing With Industry?" concluded that the annual cost of 
effective air and water pollution abatement would average less 
than one-third of one percent of value-added by all manufactur-
ing and electric power industries.21 This relatively small cost did 
not appear to warrant federal cost-sharing. 
The federal subsidy through the investment credit was also 
considered an inefficient and, in the long run, possibly counter 
productive approach to pollution abatement. The investment 
credit could only be available for investment in end-of-the-line 
hardware. Thus, there would be marked incentive for businesses 
to use hardware as a solution to every pollution problem, pre-
cluding experimentation with changes in fuel, processing tech-
niques, or changes in raw materials utilization, none of which 
could qualify for the federal tax cost-sharing funds. Technically, 
these latter methods appear to many antipollution experts to 
offer sounder long range approaches to pollution abatement, and 
Secretary Finch therefore argued that the tax credit would sub-
sidize the more inefficient and ineffective techniques. 
Despite Treasury and HEW opposition to an investment 
credit, and with no substantive supporting study, the House 
Ways and Means Committee voted a special five year rapid 
amortization provision for certified pollution control facilities as a 
substitute for the seven percent investment credit.22 Under this 
provision, a taxpayer could deduct the total cost of pollution 
abatement equipment in five years even though normal tax 
depreciation rules would establish a longer useful life for the 
property. Viewed as a tax measure, the Treasury estimated that 
equipment with a fifty year useful life would have received a tax 
benefit from the new rapid write-off provision equal to a 20 
percent investment credit.23 Viewed as an expenditure provision, 
the House in effect proposed to appropriate $400 million annually 
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to share costs for an effort that, from the evidence available, 
needed no subsidy, and for an approach which, in the view of the 
experts, would in the long run De ineffective and inefficient. 
In hearings before the Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 
12290, the Treasury acquiesced rather half-heartedly in the five 
year rapid amortization provision for pollution control facilities, 
but suggested that the scope of the House provision be limited in 
several respects.24 First, the Treasury recommended that the tax 
assistance not be made available to plants constructed in the 
future, which presumably would install antipollution control 
facilities under local regulatory requirements. Second, in order 
to eliminate the bias in favor of property with a long useful life, 
the Treasury recommended that the rapid write-off be available 
only for the first fifteen years of the life of any property. Finally, 
the Treasury concluded that the definition of a qualified pollution 
control facility should be tightened so that the tax preference 
would apply only to treatment facilities which are clearly 
identifiable as serving only antipollution purposes. 
In later hearings on H. R.13270 (The Tax Reform Act of1969), 
the Treasury belatedly recanted its earlier position and raised 
serious doubts as to the necessity for and effectiveness of a tax 
incentive for pollution control: 
The overwhelming incentive for industrial pollution control will 
continue to be governmental anti-pollution enforcement action, or 
the threat thereof. A tax relief provision in this setting is not an in-
centive so much as it is a type of cost sharing, or more accurately, 
an interest-free loan, to reduce the industrial cost of compliance with 
enforcement action.25 
The Treasury did, however, repeat its earlier testimony that, at a 
minimum, the provision should be amended to limit the write-off 
to the first fifteen years of the life of the facility and to restrict the 
write-off to facilities installed in existing plants.26 
In the Senate hearings both on H. R. 12290 and H. R. 13270, 
industry representatives strongly endorsed the five year amor-
tization provisionY Some representatives proposed even more 
ambitious alternatives to the five year write-off such as (1) allow-
ing a taxpayer to use an investment tax credit in conjunction 
with the rapid amortization,28 (2) giving the taxpayer the option 
of writing off the cost of the pollution control facilities in a period 
of less than five years,29 (3) broadening the category of qualified 
facilities to include fuel desulphurization facilities,30 land31 and 
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smokestacks,32 and (4) eliminating the dual certification of state 
and federal agencies and vesting complete supervisory powers in 
the state agencies.33 
III. TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF SECTION 169 
The Senate Finance Committee voted to include a special five 
year amortization provision in the Tax Reform Act of 1969,34 
and this version was adopted by the conference committee.30 The 
deduction is limited to pollution control facilities added to plants 
which were in operation before January 1, 1969 and only for that 
proportion of the cost of the property attributable to the first 
fifteen years of its normal useful life.36 The special deduction is 
allowable only for a "certified pollution control facility," which 
generally is defined as depreciable property which is a separate 
identifiable treatment facility used to abate or control water 
or atmospheric pollution or contamination by removing, alter-
ing, disposing or storing pollutants, contaminants, wastes or 
heat, and which is appropriately certified. A building is not a 
pollution control facility unless it is exclusively a treatment 
facility, and a pollution control facility does not include any 
facility which serves any function other than pollution abate-
ment. Facilities which only diffuse pollution, as distinct from 
abating it, do not qualify. Thus, a smokestack on a plant whose 
height was increased to disperse pollutants over a broader area 
would not be a qualified pollution control facility. Also, section 
169 does not provide tax assistance for the cost of fuel desulphuri-
zation facilities or other facilities that remove pollutants from 
fuel, apparently because such expenditures cannot be separated 
from income producing activities. 
The special deduction is available only with respect to a 
pollution control facility which is certified by the appropriate 
state and federal authorities.37 The state authority must certify to 
the federal authority that the facility has been constructed or 
acquired in conformity with the state program or requirements 
regarding the abatement or control of water or air pollution or 
contamination. Then the responsible federal agency must certify 
to the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to any pollution 
control facility that the facility (1) is in compliance with the 
applicable regulations of federal agencies, and (2) is in further-
ance of the general policies of the United States for cooperation 
with the states in the prevention and abatement of water and air 
pollution under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or the 
.. 
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Clean Air Act, respectively. The federal certifying authority 
cannot certify any facility to the extent that it appears that the 
costs of the facility will be recovered over its actual useful life by 
reason of profits arising from the recovery of wastes or otherwise 
in the operation of the facility.3s 
Rapid amortization is available only with respect to a facility, 
the construction of which was completed by the taxpayer after 
1968, or which was acquired after 1968 if the original use com-
mences with the taxpayer after that time,39 and which is placed in 
service before January 1, 1975. This termination date reflects a 
congressional decision to review the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the new tax preference before it becomes too solidly embedded 
in the tax laws. 
IV. TAX EXPENDITURES AND TAX EQUITY 
Although the life of section 169 is of limited duration, it is still 
instructive to examine its effect upon the corporate income tax 
system.40 Since the passage of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909,41 
in which the federal government assessed its first income tax on 
corporations, there has been a continuing concern that the rev-
enue-raising purpose of the tax has been beclouded by the use 
of the tax as a device for implementing other government 
policies.42 This concern has expressed itself in terms of closing 
"loopholes," broadening the tax base and the like. 
More recently a new concept has emerged which has proved to 
be a highly useful tool in evaluating the impact of special tax 
rules from the standpoint of tax equity and fiscal efficiency. 
Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy 
Stanley S. Surrey has labeled these rules as "tax expenditures," 
defining them as those "special provisions of the federal income 
tax system which represent government expenditures made 
through that system to achieve various social and economic ob-
jectives."43 Correlatively, a tax expenditure may be viewed as "an 
estimate of the amount of revenue that would be raised if the tax 
law conformed to an agreed model."44 Tax expenditures may take 
the form of deductions, credits, exclusions, exemptions, deferrals, 
or preferential rates. While most of the tax expenditure discussion 
has centered on the individual income tax,45 the concept has equal 
validity in analyzing the provisions of the federal corporate in-
come tax. 
Put in its simplest terms, the tax expenditure concept views a 
deduction, for example, as an imputed collection of the tax that 
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would have been due had the deduction not been available, with a 
simultaneous appropriation of funds by the federal government 
to the taxpayer in the amount of the tax saving. The tax ex-
penditure can take the form of a direct grant, a low cost or inter-
est-free loan, or interest subsidy, or any of a variety of other 
direct governmen tal programs. 
Tax expenditures, however, deviate from principles of tax 
fairness by exempting income from tax, by permitting excessive 
or accelerated deductions, or by providing preferential rates of 
tax. In the corporate area, two businesses with the same net 
business income will pay differing amounts of tax if one can 
qualify for the special benefits accorded through the tax ex-
penditure. It is therefore useful to analyze the new rapid amor-
tization provision for pollution control facilities as a tax ex-
penditure, and then to project it as a direct expenditure system to 
evaluate its efficiency and effectiveness. Only if such an analysis 
is undertaken can one determine if the price paid in the loss of tax 
equity is worth the benefits derived from effecting the federal 
expenditure through the tax system. 
There are several threshold factors which must be taken into 
account in determining whether the corporate income tax system 
should be used to accomplish the major social objective of solving 
the air and water pollution problem. First, a corporate income tax 
is successful only to the extent that it raises revenue for the 
government. The revenue raised through the corporate income 
tax approximates 25 percent of federal revenues.46 The new rapid 
write-off for pollution control facilities will reduce this take by 
some $120 million annually when fully effectiveY 
Second, although the corporate tax system does not rely on a 
progressive rate structure, tax expenditures in the corporate in-
come tax system produce inequities just as in the individual in-
come tax system. In order to insure fairness in a corporate income 
tax system, it is necessary that the system impose the same tax 
liability on corporations with equal amounts of business net in-
come, a concept that has a relatively well defined meaning in 
accounting and economic terms. The new rapid amortization 
provision results in tax inequity since two firms with the same 
business net income will pay different corporate income taxes 
only because of the ability of one firm to use the rapid write-off. 
Even though society benefits from increased antipollution efforts 
by corporations it is not necessary that tax favoritism accompany 
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the social reform. For example, special tax benefits generally are 
not provided for those businesses which must take extraordinary 
steps to insure safe working conditions for employees. There is a 
further inequity between firms having the same pollution prob-
lems but utilizing different methods for combatting the pollution. 
As noted above, section 169 puts a premium on capital invest-
ment in end-of-the-line pollution abatement facilities while offer-
ing no tax benefits for other pollution control activities which are 
often less expensive and more efficient than the antipollution 
hardware which receives the special deduction.48 Thus, like all tax 
expenditures, the rapid write-off provision creates differing tax 
results among similarly situated taxpayers on a basis wholly 
~part from proper rules of accounting for the cost of producing 
Income. 
There are also upside down effects that result from the rapid 
write-off provision. Corporations with a loss get no benefit from 
the special deduction. Thus, the Penn Central Railroad pre-
sumably will not benefit from section 169, although it may well 
have a substantial need for financial assistance to meet antipollu-
tion requirements or responsibilities. Similarly, under the present 
rate structure, every corporation pays a normal tax of 22 percent 
of its taxable income and a surtax of 26 percent of its taxable in-
come over $25,000.49 Thus, the special deduction for pollution 
abatement facilities for a corporation in the higher bracket is 
subsidized by the government to the extent of 48 percent of the 
cost, while an expense which qualifies as a deduction for a cor-
poration in the lower bracket is subsidized only to the extent of 
22 percent of the cost. In short, the corporation which presumably 
is in greater need of federal financial assistance gets the least help. 
V. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF VIEWING THE 
RAPID AMORTIZATION PROVISION 
A. As an Investment Credit 
It is helpful, in analyzing the rapid amortization provision, to 
.. restructure it to conform to other types of federal financial assis-
tance, tax as well as nontax. Section 169 can be reconstructed as 
an investment credit by determining the present value of the net 
additional tax saving resulting from the rapid amortization rules 
above the saving realized from normally available depreciation 
methods. To arrive at this figure, the total net after tax "loss" 
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(i.e., the increased taxes resulting from reduced depreciation 
deductions in the years following utilization of rapid amortiza-
tion) per year during the sixth year to the last year of the prop-
erty's normal useful life must be subtracted from the total net 
after-tax saving per year during years one through five. The net 
saving per year during years one through five is determined by 
subtracting the value of the deduction for each year under a 
regular depreciation method (double-declining balance, sum-of-
the-year's digits, or straight line) from the value of the deduction 
for each year under the rapid write-off provision. The total net 
saving during years one through five is then calculated by dis-
counting the net saving for each year at a rate of interest repre-
senting the corporation's opportunity investment cost. The net 
after-tax "loss" during the sixth year to the last year of the prop-
erty's normal useful life is determined by calculating the value 
of the regular depreciation deduction foregone by the taxpayer 
who has opted for the five year rapid write-off method. The total 
net after-tax "loss" is then derived by discounting the net "loss" 
for each year at the same rate of interest used to compute the 
total net savings during years one through five. 
The equity issue is focused by comparing the tax credit thus 
computed and allowed for a 48 percent bracket corporation with 
investment in qualifying pollution control facilities, a 48 percent 
bracket corporation which takes antipollution steps that do not 
qualify for the federal tax aid, and a 22 percent bracket corpora-
tion with investment in qualifying equipment. 
Example 1 in Appendix A demonstrates that the rapid write-off 
provision is the equivalent of a 7.968 percent tax credit for in-
vestment in pollution control equipment with a fifteen-year use-
fullife for a corporation in a 48 percent tax bracket. On the other 
hand, rapid amortization will produce the equivalent of only a 
3.653 percent tax credit for investment in the same facilities by a 
corporation in a 22 percent tax bracket, assuming a 10 percent 
discount factor in each case. And, of course, a corporation that 
utilizes fuel desulphurization techniques gets no tax credit at all. 
B. As a Direct Grant Program 
If section 169 were recast as a direct grant program for the 
parties described in Example 1, the description of the federal loan 
program would read as follows. 
Every corporation that purchases a $150,000 certified pollution 
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control facility shall be eligible to receive a direct grant from the 
federal government upon the following terms: 
1. If a corporation has profits in excess of $25,000 for the year in 
question, the taxpayer will receive a federal grant of $11,952; 
2. If a corporation realizes less than $25,000 in profits for the year 
inquestion, it will receive a federal grant of$5,479; 
3. If a corporation has no taxable income or suffers a loss for the 
year in question, then it will receive no aid from the federal govern-
ment;60 
4. If the corporation pursues alternative pollution control mea-
sures not involving the acquisition of pollution abatement facilities, 
the government will provide no financial assistance at all. 
I t is difficult to postulate a Congressman or Senator voting for a 
direct grant system structured on the above model. Yet, this is, in 
effect, what Congress did when it included Section 169 as part of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1969. 
C. As an Interest-Free Loan 
Section 169 can also be viewed as an interest-free loan by the 
federal government in the amount of the taxes which would have 
been paid had regular depreciation been taken for tax purposes 
during the five year rapid write-off period. The loan is repaid in 
subsequent years (years 6-15) when the corporation has already 
written off the cost of the facility and must forego depreciation 
deductions to which it would ordinarily be entitled. 
Example 2 in Appendix A illustrates the amount of interest 
saving that is derived from the rapid amortization provision. 
Again, the upside down effect of the tax benefit is apparent. A 
corporation in the 48 percent bracket is awarded a government 
loan that saves $24,038.70 in interest which the government fore-
goes to collect. But the 22 percent bracket corporation derives 
only $11,029.10 in interest savings on the government loan. And, 
again, the government loan is simply not available to the corpora-
tion with a net operating loss; it must go into the regular com-
mercial money market for funds with which to acquire antipollu-
tion equipment. 
Nor does the amount of the loan have any relation to the prob-
lem of pollution control or, indeed, to the size of the business 
operation, since heavy losses could conceivably place a very large 
business in the lower tax bracket. Thus, section 169 gives the 
least help to corporations which are most in need of government 
aid-smaller corporations or corporations with no taxable income. 
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D. As a Reduction in Interest Rates 
on Traditional Financing 
Finally, section 169 can be viewed as a federal loan program for 
the full capital costs of the pollution control facilities but at inter-
est rates below commercial levels. Example 3 in Appendix A 
illustrates the effect of recasting the five year rapid write-off 
provision as a reduction in interest rates on a 100 percent mort-
gage at a 10 percent interest rate for the life of the facility for a 48 
percent and 22 percent bracket corporation respectively. 
This example illustrates the contours of the direct loan pro-
gram that the Departments of Interior and HEW would be re-
quired to ask for if they were to model it on the present tax 
provisions. These Departments would be saying to Congress that 
they should be authorized to loan funds for pollution control 
equipment to corporations with more than $25,000 in profits at an 
interest rate of 7.986 percent. But corporations with less profit 
would be required to pay an interest rate of 9.384 percent. Cor-
porations with a loss must pay the full 10 percent interest 
charge.51 
E. Impact of the Minimum Tax 
Congress, interestingly enough, recognized the adverse impact 
on tax equity of section 169 by providing that the new minimum 
tax be applied to the excess of rapid amortization over other 
forms of allowable depreciation.52 The minimum tax can thus be 
viewed as the "interest" which the government is charging for its 
"10an."53 However, the minimum tax does not cure the inequity in 
section 169 for the amount and the incidence of this tax "inter-
est" are highly arbitrary and erratic in operation. 
If the 10 percent minimum tax is regarded as the "interest" on 
the loan, the effective interest rate is substantially lower than the 
market rate of interest. Example 2 in 4ppendix A illustrates a 
situation where neither Corporation A nor Corporation B will 
pay any "interest" because the difference between the rapid 
amortization deduction and the double-declining balance deduc-
tion never exceeds the $30,000 exemption of Section 56(a) (1) 
of the Code. More generally, it is difficult to determine any 
rational policy behind a loan system that imposes an interest 
charge on the basis of the relationship between, say, the amount 
of percen tage depletion a taxpayer claims and his regular taxes 
paid. 
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Even if the difference between the rapid amortization deduc-
tion (plus other tax preferences) and the double-declining balance 
deduction exceeded the $30,000 exemption and income taxes for 
the year, the 10 percent "interest" charge must be divided by the 
term of the loan to determine the effective interest rate. Assume, 
for example, that Corporation A in Example 2, has under section 
56(a) (1), other items of tax preference, so that the net tax savings 
for year 1 ($4,739) which results from using rapid amortization 
in lieu of double-declining balance depreciation is subject to the 
10 percent minimum tax. Hence, the "interest" charge payable 
in year 1 is $473.90. This interest is all prepaid since the loan is 
comprised of a $4,631 loan for five years and a $108 loan for 6 
years. See Chart III, Example 2. The actual annual interest rate 
on the $4,631 loan is 2 percent (the 10% minimum tax divided by 
the term of the loan, 5 years), while on the $108 loan it is 1.667 
percent (the 10% minimum tax divided by the term of the loan, 6 
years). If Corporation A in the example did not incur a minimum 
tax until year 3, the "interest" burden would, of course, be differ-
ent. But one searches in vain for any rational explanation for the 
variances either in terms of federal tax or lending policy. In any 
event, the minimum tax can hardly be viewed as a rational inter-
est increment if the rapid amortization privilege is viewed as a 
government loan program. 
VI. SECTION 169 AS A FORM OF FEDERAL COST SHARING 
Analysis of the new rapid write-off privilege for pollution con-
trol facilities as a tax expenditure reveals its adverse impact on 
tax equity in the federal corporate income tax system, and its 
inherent irrationality when viewed as a program of direct federal 
financial assistance. Nonetheless, it is necessary to explore the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the section 169 mechanism in deal-
ing with the problems of air and water pollution. For proponents 
of tax expenditures argue that use of the tax system will permit 
the task at hand to be attacked by private industry more effici-
ently and effectively than if direct federal financing programs are 
involved. 
Although the avowed purpose of section 169 is to offer private 
industry an incentive to install pollution abatement equipment, 
it is doubtful that this tax expenditure will stimulate such invest-
ment.54 Unlike the 7 percent investment tax credit which applied 
to profit-making as well as non-profit making investments, section 
24 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
169 applies only to the latter category. The statute specifically 
states that property is not eligible for rapid amortization "to 
the extent that it appears that by reason of profits derived 
through the recovery of wastes or otherwise in the operation of 
such property, its costs will be recovered over its actual useful 
life."65 Since pollution control equipment is generally an eco-
nomic loss item, the federal tax assistance will merely reduce 
the amount of the loss which would be incurred by industry, 
absent such assistance. Businessmen do not ordinarily invest in 
unprofitable ventures regardless of the fact that losses will be 
limited. In making investment decisions, businessmen usually 
compare anticipated rates of return on alternative investments 
and choose the project with the highest projected rate of return. 
Since an investment in a "certified pollution control facility" is by 
definition an investment in a venture with little or no return, it is 
unlikely that industrialists, not otherwise disposed toward 
making such an investment, will be induced to make the invest-
ment as a result of the available tax assistance. 
The only real incentives for investment in pollution control 
facilities are: (1) the favorable effect which such investment 
should have on public relations; (2) the avoidance of the time and 
money costs of enforcement proceedings in connection with local 
regulations; (3) the preservation of amicable relations with the 
federal, state, and local governments; and (4) the manager's 
personal satisfaction in realizing that he has made a contribution 
toward the improvement of environmental quality.56 Opposed to 
these incentives are three positive reasons for industry to refuse to 
invest in pollution control facilities. First, more generous direct 
federal aid may be available to industry in the future if federal 
defense spending declines relatively and as the pollution problem 
becomes more acute. Second, research presently being done should 
provide the basis for pollution control strategies less costly and 
more efficient than present pollution abatement methods. Third, 
delay allows a firm to invest in alternative profit-making invest-
ments and to save the operating expenses which would have to be 
incurred to run and maintain pollution control facilities.57 Thus, 
the incentive effect of section 169 is questionable at best.58 
The justification for the new provision must, therefore, rest on 
the assertion that it is the best means of cost-sharing available. 
I t is necessary here to consider two preliminary questions. One, 
should the public bear a significant part of the cost of industrial 
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pollution abatement? Two, is the projected cost to industry of 
effective pollution control so large as to warrant additional 
federal cost-sharing, however erratic? 
With respect to the first question, it is clear that section 169 is 
bottomed on the assumption that the public should bear a 
significant share of the cost of pollution control in the form of 
foregone taxes. Many economists, on the other hand, assert that 
the direct cost of abating industrial pollution should largely be 
borne by industry. Professor Roberts of Harvard University 
cogently summarizes this argument as follows: 
Tax incentives are also inefficient in an economic sense ... in that 
they shift the cost of abatement from the polluter and the consumers 
of his goods to the government. In so doing such schemes interfere 
with market adjustments which would otherwise lead to production 
of the "correct" bundle of goods and services for society. For years 
now polluting firms have been imposing costs on the users of streams 
and rivers in the form of the wastes they add to the water. These 
wastes interfere with recreation and make it unpleasant for all who 
encounter the dirty water. Who benefits from this dirty water? The 
answer is those individuals who purchase the goods whose production 
generated the pollution, as well as those individuals who "own" 
inputs (capital, land, or labor) that have special usefulness in pra-
ducing these goods. At the moment these individuals do not pay for 
the "external" costs they impose on others. The logic of economic 
efficiency indicates that in the long run consumers and producers of 
pollution-creating products should pay prices that reflect the real 
total costs to society of producing the goods in question including 
the cost of abating their pollution. Thus, subject to some compli-
cated theoretical economic qualifications, the prices of pollution-
producing goods should rise enough to cover the cost of controlling 
that pollution. To the extent that tax incentives or other federal 
grants reduce the costs of pollution-producing goods, a non-optimal 
set of goods will be produced for society.59 
With respect to the second question, it should be noted that the 
public is already providing cost-sharing benefits to industry in 
programs quite apart from special tax incentives through research, 
low interest loans, and direct grants.60 Furthermore, as noted 
earlier, the 1967 federal interagency report estimated that the 
average additional annual cost caused by pollution abatement is 
significant but relatively small for all manufacturing firms. 61 The 
report concluded that the annual cost of effective air and water 
pollution abatement would be less than one-third of one percent 
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of value-added by all manufacturing and electric power indus-
tries. 62 Although the report indicates that some industries will 
experience substantially higher costs, it concludes that federal 
assistance on an industry-wide basis is not presently needed. The 
most promising approach would appear to be a low-cost loan 
program directed at particular marginal situations where the 
costs of compliance with antipollution regulations produce a 
significant economic hardship. 
Even if one reaches the conclusion that the public should pro-
perly bear a large part of the cost of industrial pollution abate-
ment and that the cost to industry is sufficiently large as to 
warrant additional federal cost-sharing, there are a number of 
defects in the rapid amortization provision which militate against 
its use. 
A fundamental defect of section 169 results from the misalloca-
tion of economic resources that it produces. From the standpoint 
of businessmen's decision-making, it is important that the tax 
system remain neutral. The tax system violates this principal 
when special benefits provide a greater after-tax rate of return for 
one of two possible investments solely because of the tax gain so 
generated. If economic neutrality is violated, resource use will 
differ from that which would result if the tax system were more 
nearly neutral. 63 
Section 169 violates economic neutrality since a businessman, 
in comparing two types of pollution abatement expenditures, 
may select methods involving capital outlays rather than, say, 
more efficient use of present facilities, solely because the tax 
benefit goes to the first and not the second type of expenditure. 
To the extent that the new provision induces certain types of in-
vestments it may be an inefficient method of combatting air and 
water pollution. In order to qualify for special treatment under 
section 169, the pollution control facility must be a "new identifi-
able treatment facility which is used ... to abate or control water 
or atmospheric pollution or contamination by removing, altering, 
disposing, or storing of pollutants, contaminants, wastes, or 
heat .... "64 A "new identifiable treatment facility" is further de-
fined as depreciable tangible property.65 As noted above, qualified 
facilities exclude buildings and their structural components un-
less used exclusively as a treatment facility,66 facilities which only 
disperse pollution, as opposed to facilities that abate pollution,67 
and facilities that remove pollutants, such as sulphur, from fuel. 68 
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Section 169, thus, encourages corporations to invest in capital-
oriented projects for abating pollution, and to neglect other 
important and often less costly and more efficient ways of con-
trolling pollution. This is a result of the fact that capital ex-
penditures are made artificially less expensive relative to other 
techniques by virtue of the five year amortization provision. Cor-
respondingly, the real cost of pollution control to society will be 
higher than it would have been without the tax aid.69 For ex-
ample, section 169 provides no tax advantage for the following 
pollution control practices which might be less costly and more 
effective than investment in "new identifiable treatment facili-
ties": (1) purchasing land on which to construct treatment 
ponds;70 (2) chemical precipitation; 71(3) labor for operation and 
maintenance;72 (4) labor for more careful control of production 
processes;73 (5) use of dispersion equipment such as high smoke 
stacks;74 and (6) fuel substitution. 76 The last alternative is the 
least costly method in more than 50 percent of the cases involving 
sulphur oxide air pollution abatement. 76 
Another important infirmity of section 169 is that it provides 
little incentive for a corporation to utilize changes which add to 
plant output while reducing pollution. In some industries, over 50 
percent of the lowest-cost opportunities for reducing waste load 
discharges are found in such process changes.77 It is doubtful 
whether a facility would qualify under section 169 if it has two 
functions, i.e., increasing output and reducing pollution. The 
Report of the Senate Finance Committee states explicitly that 
"a pollution control facility does not include any facility which 
serves any function other than pollution abatement."78 The 
section, itself, disqualifies facilities whose costs are recovered 
through the sale of wastes or otherwise.79 I t has even been sug-
gested that this bias in section 169 might so reduce the incentive 
to use process changes that enough extra waste would be pro-
duced to offset the increase in treatment capacity resulting from 
the incentive. 80 
The tax expenditure also fails to reward economies in pollution 
control which derive from regional cooperation and central treat-
ment facilities operated by a municipality or other government 
agency. Section 169 might make it less expensive after taxes for a 
corporation to invest in its own facilities rather than to have its 
waste treated by a central agency, even though before taxes 
central treatment charges were lower. If these charges reflect the 
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real costs to the central agency of treating the wastes of the plant, 
then more resources will have been used than necessary to 
achieve the pollution control objectives of the country. 81 
Yet another way in which section 169 distorts business deci-
sion-making is its inherent bias for property having a long useful 
life. Although the Conference Committee ameliorated the problem 
by limiting the amortizable basis to the proportionate part of the 
adjusted basis which is represented by the first fifteen years of the 
normal useful life of such property, it did not completely eliminate 
this bias. For exa.mple, section 169 offers the greatest benefit to 
property with a life of fifteen years or more. I t offers no benefi t 
to property with a life of five years or less. While the fifteen-year-
life rule held down the revenue cost of the measure, it can hardly 
be viewed as a rational approach to pollution abatement. 
Aside from these economic defects, there are other problems 
with the approach adopted in section 169. First, the provision is 
inefficient in providing tax benefits to all corporations regardless 
of whether the corporation would have purchased the equipment 
without the tax benefits. As mentioned earlier, the primary 
incentive for a manufacturer to install antipollution devices is not 
the availability of a tax benefit, but the avoidance of local reg-
ulatory enforcement proceedings with attendant bad publicity. 
Thus, section 169 gives a windfall to corporate taxpayers for 
doing something that they would have done without the tax 
incentive. 
Section 169 is not targeted to meet priority areas. Some indus-
tries and corporations account for more pollution than others. 
For example, transporation industries account for more air pollu-
tion than manufacturing industries.82 Some cities and states are 
more poIlu ted than others. The new provision does not allow the 
federal government to direct aid or assistance to priority areas. In 
a sense, this failure can also be considered a misallocation of 
scarce resources. 
One of the most critical deficiencies of section 169 is that 
Congress has very little control over the extent and the nature of 
the assistance which it is granting. The technology of pollution 
abatement has not reached the point where a definite strategy 
can be followed. When this fact is considered in conjunction with 
the diverse p,ollution problems in different localities and the 
various posslble abatement techniques, it is obvious that the 
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keynote of a sound policy must be flexibility. Unfortunately, 
section 169 commits the country to an inflexible method, which, 
because it is embedded in the tax system, automatically affords it 
first priority on available government revenues. 
A sound pollution abatement policy must also be subject to 
constant scrutiny and evaluation, so that priorities can be estab-
lished on a rational basis. The tax expenditure for industry using 
section 169 is not part of the federal budget and it is thus difficult 
for the public to evaluate the nature and extent of the aid. 83 
VII. POLLUTION, POLITICS AND TAX POLICY 
The rapid amortization privilege for pollution control facilities 
appears to be an ill-advised response to the pollution problem. As 
a tax expenditure it violates the integrity of the federal corporate 
income tax system, with resultant distortions in tax equity. As a 
system of federal cost sharing, it is an inefficient and ineffective 
vehicle for providing federal financial assistance in the vital 
battle against air and water pollution. The above analysis sug-
gests that any attempt to utilize the federal tax system as a means 
of financing the pollution effort will suffer the same infirmities. In 
a time of strong pressures on the federal budget it is therefore 
unfortunate that Congress saw fit to allocate annually over $100 
million-some 10 percent of the amount now directly expended 
for the pollution problem-of our national resources in this 
fashion. 
But if the foregoing analysis of section 169 is correct, the ques-
tion that remains is why Congress would enact such a provision. 
The answer lies in the political potency that the antipollution 
effort has amassed. Senators and Representatives could not vote 
against a measure that had the label "pollution control" affixed to 
it. Since the Senate Finance Committee approved the provision 
as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 there was little chance to 
strike the measure on the Senate floor. Issues of tax equity, 
efficiency, and effectiveness could not stand up to pollution con-
trol in political terms. 
Senator Gore did try to eliminate the five year rapid write-off 
from the bill. 84 But his amendment was overwhelmingly de-
feated. 86 The problem that those concerned with tax fairness face 
when dealing with a tax preference for activities that have a 
strong claim on the nation's social and economic resources was 
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exemplified by Senator Muskie's position on the Gore amend-
ment. Muskie consistently voted for tax reform throughout con-
sideration of the Tax Reform Act. But he abandoned tax equity in 
favor of dollars for the antipollution effort. In declaring his op-
position to Gore's proposal to delete the new rapid write-off 
provision, Muskie declared: 
Mr. President, I rise to oppose that portion of the Gore amend-
ment which has to do with the amortization of pollution control 
facilities in the case of both air and water. 
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, 
I have been concerned ... with the problem of stimulating the 
construction of waste treatment facilities in the public sector .... 
Although in the subcommittee we do not have jurisdiction over tax 
legislation, the subcommittee-going back to 1966 in the report on 
the 1966 Clean Water Restoration Act-has advocated tax incen-
tives to mount an industrial effort comparable to the public effort .... 
This rax relief is only a stimulation to industry to make the in-
vestments called for by air and water quality standards. 86 
Muskie's position on section 169 illustrates the problem that 
faces those concerned with and responsible for maintenance of the 
integrity of the federal income tax system each time a proposal is 
made to provide a tax incentive to assist in meeting the social and 
economic problems that confront our nation-whether it be educa-
tion, housing, unemployment, or some other social need. A vote 
against the tax preference appears to be a vote against the 
underlying substantive problem. Advocates of a fair tax system 
must thus adequately arm themselves with data and arguments-
cast in politically persuasive terms-to demonstrate the in-
adequacy of the particular tax approach in terms of meeting the 
social problem itself. 
VIII. THE TASK AHEAD 
Congress, in enacting new section 169, placed a 5 year life on 
the measure to insure congressional review of the effectiveness of 
the provision before it becomes a permanent aspect of the tax 
structure. Although in our view the passage of the present provi-
sion was ill advised, the provision is now in the law. The task to be 
undertaken in the next five years is to develop data that can 
provide a basis for congressional decision-making when section 
169 is reviewed. 
, 
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The first order of business is to pose the questions, the ex-
ploration of which will provide Congressmen and Senators with 
the needed information concerning the operation of section 169. 
The following are submitted as a starting point for analysisY 
1. What was the actual cost in revenues of the rapid write-off? 
2. What portion of the actual cost of pollution control equip-
ment with respect to which the special deduction was 
claimed was represented by this federal share? 
3. What corporations utilized the provision in terms of size, 
financial position, industrial classification, and geographical 
location? 
4. What kinds of pollution control equipment were acquired? 
In terms of antipollution technology, how did the devices 
compare to other forms of pollution control measures that 
did not qualify for special tax consideration? 
5. Were devices qualifying for the rapid write-off installed as 
the result of local, state or federal regulatory requirements? 
Did the devices go beyond minimum requirements? 
6. Would businesses have used alternative methods of pollu-
tion control in the absence of the rapid write-off? 
7. What amount of the rapid amortization claimed fell into the 
minimum tax base? 
8. In terms of cleaning up industrial pollution, is there a need 
for federal financial aid? Do all corporations need the same 
amount and kind of aid? All industries? Did the tax benefits 
go to the corporations that were found to need financial aid? 
9. What part of the total air and water pollution problem is 
caused by industrial pollution? Does the problem vary in 
different geographical areas? What is the correlation be-
tween this data and the answer to question 2, supra? 
The above questions provide a general framework for reference. 
But specific data must be acquired from industry if Congress is to 
be able to evaluate section 169 prior to its expiration. Who should 
collect the data? The most logical agencies would appear to be the 
offices responsible for certifying to the Treasury that pollution 
control equipment qualifies for the special deduction. 88 With each 
application for certification, the responsible agencies could require 
information to be submitted with respect to the questions out-
lined above. 
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Specifically, information should be required with respect to 
each property as to its cost, its useful life, and its exact geo-
graphical location. The company should be required to state 
whether it had ever been involved with regulatory proceedings 
under state or local law concerning the particular plant, whether 
in the form of enforcement proceedings or abatement conferences. 
Information as to the timing of installing the equipment should 
be elicited, e.g., the date on which the management or the board 
of directors approved the facility and the dates when the principal 
components were acquired. The existence and cost of any avail-
able municipal or regional disposal facilities should also be 
ascertained. Did the business consider these alternatives and why 
did it reject them? 
Such data would help to answer the basic question whether 
section 169 in fact operates as an incentive, whether it was effec-
tively utilized where the need was greatest, and whether it en-
courages the most efficient utilization of resources to meet pollu-
tion problems. 
Since section 169 is a tax measure it might be thought that the 
Treasury and Internal Revenue Service should be the data col-
lecting agencies. The agencies responsible for certification appear 
to be superior resources however. The issues involved in analyzing 
section 169 are really economic and technical in nature, more 
than tax. Further, reliance on the Internal Revenue Service will 
require the development of considerably more sophisticated tax 
forms than are now being used. For 1970, the corporate tax return, 
Form 1120, simply requires a listing of the total amortization 
deductions claimed,89 with an explanatory schedule to be at-
tached. It would be an arduous task to try to physically locate 
those returns for examination and extract useful data therefrom. 
If the Internal Revenue Service is to be utilized as the data 
collecting agency, Congress should specifically authorize and 
require the Service to act so that forms can be revised for 1971 
and thereafter to facilitate computer print-outs of relevant data. 
It is obvious that the necessary data is of a mixed nature. Some 
of the information is purely factual-cost, useful life, and the like. 
But other important information is necessary to determine 
business motives and intent. It is thus essential that skilled public 
survey personnel participate with economists and engineers in 
developing the questionnaires. 
Once the data is collected, it must be analyzed. Here, Congress 
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, should utilize outside resources, such as economists and research 
organizations concentrating on the pollution problem, as well as 
government agencies such as Treasury, HEW, Interior and the 
Office of Management and Budget. 
The importance of establishing criteria now for evaluating 
section 169 cannot be overstated. It will be too late if we wait 
until 1974. And it would be singularly unfortunate if section 169 
is reviewed in the data vacuum that existed during its passage in 
1969. In the absence of concrete data and informed evaluation 
thereof, the congressional policy-makers will be able to do little 
more than weigh the politics of pollution against tax equity, 
without any real basis for informed judgment as to whether the 
price paid in tax fairness was worth the benefits derived in terms 
of greater pollution control. 
Assumptions: 
ApPENDIX A 
Example 1 
1. Property with cost of $150,000 purchased on the first day of the 
tax year. 
2. Discount rate of ten percent. 
3. Normal useful life of property is 15 years with no salvage value. 
4. Corporation A is in the 48 percent tax bracket while Corporation 
B is in the 22 percent tax bracket. 
5. Neither Corporation A nor Corporation B is subject to the ten 
percent minimum tax on tax preferences. gO 
6. Corporations A and B have both elected to take an additional 
first year 20 percent depreciation deduction. 91 
7. Both Corporation A and Corporation B would have used the 
double-declining balance method of computing depreciation if they had 
not opted for utilization of five-year amortization.92 
8. The tax surcharge on corporate income has been disregarded.93 
Corpora tion A 
I. Double Declining Balance Depreciation for Years 1-5: 
Year 1 $21,72894 
Year 2 17 ,099 
Year 3 14 , 819 
Year 4 12 ,844 
YearS 11,132 
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II. Value of the Depreciation Deduction for Years 1-5: 
Year 1 ($21,728)(.48) = $10,429 
Year 2 ( 17,099) (.48) = 8,208 
Year 3 ( 14,819) (.48) = 7,113 
Year 4 ( 12,844) (.48) 6,165 
Year 5 ( 11,132) (.48) = 5,343 
III. Five Year Rapid Amortization Under Section 169 of the Internal 
Revenue Code:95 
Year 1 
Year 2 
Year 3 
Year 4 
Year 5 
$31,60096 
29,600 
29,600 
29,600 
29,600 
IV. Value of the Amortization Deduction Under Section 169 for Years 
1-5: 
Year 1 ($31,600) (.48) = $15,168 
Year 2 ( 29,600) (.48) = 14,208 
Year 3 ( 29,600) (.48) = 14,208 
Year 4 ( 29,600) (.48) = 14,208 
Year 5 ( 29,600) (.48) 14,208 
V. Net Savings Per Year During Years 1-5 Using Rapid Amortization 
in Lieu of Regular Deprecia tion: 
Year 1 $15,168 minus $10,429 $4,739 
Year 2 14,208 minus 8,208 = 6,000 
Year 3 14,208 minus 7,113 7,095 
Year 4 14,208 minus 6,165 = 8,043 
Year 5 14,208 minus 5,343 8,865 
VI. Present Value of Net Savings Per-Year During Years 1-5 Using 
Ra pid Amortiza tion in Lieu of Regular Deprecia tion: 
Year 1 ($4,739) (.909) = $ 4,308 
Year 2 ( 6,000) (.826) = 4,956 
Year 3 (7,095)(.751) = 5,328 
Year 4 ( 8,043) (.683) = 5 ,493 
Year 5 ( 8,865) (.621) = 5,505 
Total Savings $25,590 
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VII. Double Declining Balance Depreciation for Years 6-15 (if section 
169 had not been used): 
Year 6 
Year 7 
Year 8 
Year 9 
Year 10 
Year 11 
Year 12 
Year 13 
Year 14 
Year 15 
$9,648 
8,362 
7,257 
6,73097 
6,730 
6,730 
6,730 
6,730 
6,730 
6,731 
VIII. Value of the Depreciation Deduction for Years 6-15 (net 
reduction in loss of depreciation deduction per year by using §169): 
Year 6 ($9,648) (.48) = $4,631 
Year 7 ( 8,362) (.48) 4,014 
Year 8 ( 7,257) (.48) = 3,483 
Year 9 ( 6,730) (.48) 3,230 
Year 10 ( 6,730) (.48) 3,230 
Year 11 ( 6,730) (.48) 3,230 
Year 12 ( 6,730) (.48) 3,230 
Year 13 ( 6,730) (.48) = 3,230 
Year 14 ( 6,730) (.48) 3,230 
Year 15 ( 6,731) (.48) = 3,230 
IX. Present Value of Net Loss of Depreciation Deduction Per-Year 
During Years 6-15: 
Year 6 
Year 7 
Year 8 
Year 9 
Year 10 
Year 11 
Year 12 
Year 13 
Year 14 
Year 15 
($4,631) (.564) = 
( 4,014) (.513) = 
( 3,483) (.467) 
( 3,230) (.424) = 
( 3,230) (.386) 
( 3,230) (.350) 
( 3,230) (.319) 
( 3,230) (.290) = 
( 3,230) (.263) 
( 3,230) (.239) = 
Total Net Loss 
$2,616 
2,059 
1,627 
1,370 
1,247 
1,131 
1,030 
937 
849 
772 
$13,638 
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X. Present Value of Using Rapid Amortization in Lieu of Regular 
Deprecia tion: 
$25,590 minus 13,638=$11,952 
XI. Rapid Amortization Recast as an Investment Credit: 
11 ,592 
7.968% 
150,000 
Corporation B 
I. Double Declining Balance Depreciation for Years 1-5: 
Year 1 $21,728 
Year 2 17 ,099 
Year 3 14,819 
Year 4 12,844 
YearS 11,132 
II. Value of the Depreciation Deduction for Years 1-5: 
Year 1 ($21,728) (.22) = $4,780 
Year 2 (17,099) (.22) 3,762 
Year 3 ( 14,819) (.22) = 3,260 
Year 4 ( 12,844) (.22) = 2,826 
Year 5 ( 11,132) (.22) 2,449 
III. Five Year Rapid Amortization Under Section 169 of the Internal 
Revenue Code: 
Year 1 
Year 2 
Year 3 
Year 4 
Year 5 
$31,600 
29,600 
29,600 
29,600 
29,600 
IV. Value of the Amortization Deduction Under Section 169 for Years 
1-5: 
Year 1 
Year 2 
Year 3 
Year 4 
Year 5 
($31,600) (.22) 
( 29,600) (.22) 
( 29,600) (.22) 
( 29,600) (.22) 
( 29,600) (.22) 
= 
= 
= 
$6,952 
6,512 
6,512 
6,512 
6,512 
•. 
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V. Net Savings Per-Year During Years 1-5 Using Rapid Amortization 
in Lieu of Regular Depreciation: 
Year 1 $6,952 minus $4,780 = $2,172 
Year 2 6,512minus 3,762 = 2,750 
Year 3 6,512 minus 3,260 = 3,252 
Year 4 6,512 minus 2,826 = 3,686 
Year 5 6,512 minus 2,449 = 4,063 
VI. Present Value of Net Savings Per-Year During Years 1-5 Using 
Rapid Amortization in Lieu of Regular Depreciation: 
Year 1 ($2,172) (.909) = $ 1,974 
Year 2 ( 2,750) (.826) = 2,272 
Year 3 ( 3,25_2) (.751) = 2,442 
Year 4 ( 3,686) (.683) 2,518 
Year 5 ( 4,063) (.621) = 2,523 
Total Savings $11,729 
VII. Double Declining Balance Depreciation for Years 6-15 (if section 
169 had not been used): 
Year 6 
Year 7 
Year 8 
Year 9 
Year 10 
Year 11 
Year 12 
Year 13 
Year 14 
Year 15 
$9,648 
8,362 
7,257 
6,730 
6,730 
6,730 
6,730 
6,730 
6,730 
6,731 
VIII. Value of Depreciation Deduction for Years 6-15 (net reduction 
in loss of depreciation deduction per year by using section 169): 
Year 6 ($9,648) (.22) = $2,123 
Year 7 ( 8,362) (.22) = 1,840 
Year 8 ( 7,257) (.22) ::::a 1,597 
Year 9 ( 6,730) (.22) = 1,481 
Year 10 (6,730)(.22) = 1,481 
Year 11 ( 6,730) (.22) = 1,481 
Year 12 ( 6,730) (.22) = 1,481 
Year 13 (6,730)(.22) = 1,481 
Year 14 (6,730)(.22) = 1,481 
Year 15 (6,730)(.22) 1,481 
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IX. Present Value of Net Loss of Depreciation Deduction Per Year 
During Years 6-15: 
Year 6 
Year 7 
Year 8 
Year 9 
Year 10 
Year 11 
Year 12 
Year 13 
Year 14 
Year 15 
($2,123) (.564) 
( 1,840) (.513) 
( 1,597) (.467) 
( 1,481) (.424) 
( 1,481) (.386) 
( 1,481) (.350) 
( 1,481) (.319) 
( 1,481) (.290) 
( 1,481) (.263) 
( 1,481) (.239) 
Total Net Loss 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
$1,197 
944 
746 
628 
572 
518 
472 
429 
390 
354 
$6,250 
X. Present Value of Using Rapid Amortization in Lieu of Regular 
Deprecia tion: 
$11,729 minus $6,250=$5,479 
XI. Rapid Amortization Recast as an Investment Credit: 
5,479 
Assumptions: 
---=3.653% 
150,000 
Example 2 
1. Property with cost of $150,000 purchased on the first day of the 
tax year. 
2. Market rate of interest at 10 percent. 
3. Corporation A is in the 48 percent tax bracket while Corporation 
B is in the 22 percent tax bracket. 
4. Neither Corporation A nor Corporation B is subject to the 10 
percent minimum tax on tax preferences. 
5. Normal useful life of property is 15 years with no salvage value. 
6. Corporations A and B have both elected to take an additional 
first-year 20 percent depreciation deduction. 
7. Both Corpora tion A and Corpora tion B would have used the 
double-declining balance method of computing depreciation if they 
had not opted for utilization of the five year write-off. 
8. The tax surcharge on corporate income has been disregarded. 
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Corporation A 
I. Net Tax Savings Per-Year During Years 1-5 Using Rapid Amortiza-
tion in Lieu of Regular Depreciation-Amount ofLoan:98 
Year 1 $ 4,739 
Year 2 6,000 
Year 3 7,095 
Year 4 8,043 
Year 5 8,865 
Total Loan $34,742 
II. Net Tax Loss Per Year During Years 6-15 Using Rapid Amorti-
zation in Lieu of Regular Depreciation-Repayment of Loan :99 
Year 6 $ 4,631 
Year 7 4,014 
Year 8 3,483 
Year 9 3,230 
Year 10 3,230 
Year 11 3,230 
Year 12 3,230 
Year 13 3,230 
Year 14 3,230 
Year 15 3,230 
Total Repayment $34,738 
III. Interest Saved on Loan or Deferral of Tax Liability: 
1. $4,631 for 5 years = $ 2,315.50 
2. 108 for 6 years = 64.80 
3. 3,906 for 5 years = 1,953.00 
4. 2,094 for 6 years = 1,238.40 
5. 1,389 for 5 years = 694.50 
6. 3,230 for 6 years = 1,938.00 
7. 2,476 for 7 years = 1,733.20 
8. 754 for 6 years = 452.40 
9. 3,230 for 7 years = 2,261.00 
10. 3,230 for 8 years 2,584.00 
11. 829 for 9 years = 746.10 
12. 2,401 for 8 years = 1,920.80 
13. 3,230 for 9 years 2,907.00 
14. 3,230 for 10 years = 3,230.00 
Total Interest Saved $24,038.70 
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Corpora tion B 
I. Net Tax Savings Per-Year During Years 1-5 Using Rapid Amorti-
zation in Lieu of Regular Depreciation-Amount ofLoan:1oo 
Year 1 $ 2,172 
Year 2 2,750 
Year 3 3,252 
Year 4 3,686 
Year 5 4,063 
Total Loan $15,923 
II. Net Tax Loss Per-Year During Years 6-15 Using Rapid Amortiza-
tion in Lieu of Regular Depreciation-Repayment ofLoan:101 
Year 6 $ 2,123 
Year 7 1,840 
Year 8 1,597 
Year 9 1,481 
Year 10 1,481 
Year 11 1,481 
Year 12 1,481 
Year 13 1,481 
Year 14 1,481 
Year 15 1,481 
$15,927 
Total Repayment 
III. Interest Saved on Loan or Deferral of Tax Liability: 
1. $2,123 for 5 years = $ 1,061.50 
2. 49 for 6 years = 29.40 
3. 1,791 for 5 years = 895.50 
4. 959 for 6 years = 575.40 
S. 638 for 5 years = 319.00 
6. 1,481 for 6 years = 888.60 
7. 1,133 for 7 years = 793.10 
8. 348 for 6 years = 208 . 80 
9. 1,481 for 7 years = 1,036.70 
10. 1,481for 8years = 1,184.80 
11. 376 for 9 years = 338.40 
12. 1,105 for 8 years = 884.00 
13. 1,481 for 9years = 1,332.90 
14. 1,481 for 10 years = 1,481.00 
Total Interest Saved $11,029.10 
• 
r 
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Example 3 
Assumptions: 
1. Property with cost of $150,000 purchased on the first day of the 
tax year. 
2. Discount rate of 10 percent. 
3. Normal useful life of property is 15 years with no salvage value. 
4. Corporation A is in the 48 percent tax bracket while Corporation 
B is in the 22 percent tax bracket. 
5. Neither Corporation A nor Corporation B is subject to the 10 
percent minimum tax on tax preferences. 
6. Corporations A and B have both elected to take an additional first 
year 20 percent depreciation deduction. 
7. Both Corporation A and Corporation B would have used the 
double-declining balance method of computing depreciation if they 
had not opted for utilization of the five-year amortization. 
8. The tax surcharge on corporate income has been disregarded. 
9. Market rate of interest is 10 percent. 
10. The loan is for $150,000-the cost of the equipment. 
11. The term of the loan is 15 years-the normal useful life of the 
equipment. 
12. X=Reduction in the rate of interest. 
Corporation A 
I. Interest Cost Per Year: 
($150,000) (10%) =$15,000 
II. Tax Savings Per-Year Through Deducting Interest Cost: 
($15,000) (48%) =$7 ,200 
III. Net After-Tax Interest Cost: 
$15,000 minus $7,200=$7,800 
IV. Present Value of Net After-Tax Interest Cost: 
Year 1 ($7,800) (. 909) = $ 7,090 
Year 2 ( 7,800) (. 826) = 6,443 
Year 3 ( 7,800) (.751) = 5,858 
Year 4 (7,800){.683) = 5,327 
Year 5 ( 7,800) (.621) = 4,844 
Year 6 ( 7,800) (.564) = 4,399 
Year 7 (7,800)(.513) = 4,001 
Year 8 ( 7,800) (.467) = 3,643 
Year 9 ( 7,800) (.424) = 3,307 
Year 10 ( 7,800) (.386) = 3,011 
Year 11 ( 7,800) (.350) = 2,730 
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Year 12 
Year 13 
Year 14 
Year 15 
Total 
( 7,800) (.319) = 
( 7,800) (.290) = 
( 7,800) (.263) = 
( 7,800) (.239) 
2,488 
2,262 
2,051 
1,864 
$59,318 
V. Present Value of Using Rapid Amortization in Lieu of Regular 
Deprecia tion: 
$11,952102 
VI. Present Value of Net After-Tax Interest Cost at Reduced Rate of 
Interest: 
$59,318 minus $11,952=$47,366. 
VII. Interest Cost Per-Year at Reduced Rate of Interest: ($150,000) 
(.10-X) =$15 ,000-150,000 X 
VIII. Tax Savings Per-Year Through Deducting the Interest at the 
Reduced Rate: 
(15,000-150,000 X) (.48) = 7 ,200-72 ,000 X 
IX. Net After-Tax Interest Cost at the Reduced Rate of Interest: 
15,000-150,000 X - [7,200-72,000 X] 
= 15 ,000-150 ,000 X - 7 ,200+ 72 ,000 X 
= 7 ,800-78,000 X 
X. Present Value of Net After-Tax Interest Cost at Reduced Rate of 
Interest: 
Year 1-(.909) (7,800-78,000 X) = 
Year 2-(.826) (7,800-78,000 X) 
Year 3-(.751) (7,800-78,000 X) 
Year 4-(.683) (7,800-78,000 X) = 
Year 5-(.621) (7,800-78,000 X) 
Year 6-(.564) (7,800-78,000 X) = 
Year 7-(.513) (7,800-78,000 X) 
Year 8-(.467) (7,800-78,000 X) = 
Year 9-(.424) (7,800-78,000 X) = 
Year 10-(.386) (7,800-78,000 X) = 
Year 11-(.350) (7,800-78,000 X) = 
Year 12-(.319) (7,800-78,000 X) = 
Year 13-(.290) (7,800-78,000 X) = 
Year 14-(.263) (7,800-78,000 X) = 
Year 15-(.239) (7,800-78,000 X) = 
Total 
$7,090- 70,900 X 
6,443- 64,430 X 
5,858- 58,580 X 
5,327- 53,270 X 
4,844- 48,440 X 
4,399- 43,990 X 
4,001- 40,010 X 
3,643- 36,430 X 
3,307- 33,070 X 
3,011- 30,110 X 
2,730- 27,300 X 
2,488- 24,880 X 
2,262- 22,620 X 
2,051- 20,510 X 
1,864- 18,640 X 
$59,318-593,180 X 
,. 
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XI. Section 169 Recast as a Reduction in Interest Cost: 
59,318-593,180 X= 47,366 
-593,180 X= -11 ,952 
X= -11,952 
-593,180 
X=2.014% 
10%-2.014%=7.986% 
Corporation B 
I. Interest Cost Per-Year: 
($150,000) (10%) =$15,000 
II. Tax Savings Per-Year Through Deducting Interest Cost: 
($15,000) (22%) =$3 ,300 
III. Net After-Tax Interest Cost: 
$15,000 minus $3,300=$11,700 
IV. Present Value of Net After-Tax Interest Cost: 
Year 1 ($11 ,700) (.909) = $10,635 
Year 2 ( 11,700) (.826) = 9,664 
Year 3 ( 11,700) (.751) = 8,787 
Year 4 ( 11,700) (.683) = 7,991 
Year 5 ( 11,700) (.621) = 7,266 
Year 6 ( 11,700) (.564) = 6,599 
Year 7 ( 11,700) (.513) = 6,002 
Year 8 ( 11,700) (.467) = 5,464 
Year 9 ( 11,700) (.424) = 4,961 
Year 10 ( 11,700) (.386) = 4,516 
Year 11 ( 11,700) (.350) = 4,095 
Year 12 ( 11,700) (.319) = 3,732 
Year 13 ( 11,700) (.290) = 3,393 
Year 14 ( 11,700) (.263) = 3,077 
Year 15 ( 11,700) (.239) = 2,796 
Total $88,978 
V. Present Value of Using Rapid Amortization in Lieu of Regular 
Deprecia tion: 
$5,479103 
VI. Present Value of Net After-Tax Interest Cost at Reduced Rate of 
Interest: 
$88,978 minus $5,479 = $83,499 
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VII. Interest Cost Per-Year at Reduced Rate ofInterest: 
($150,000) (.10-X) = 15,000-150,000 X 
VIII. Tax Savings Per-Year Through Deducting the Interest at the 
Reduced Rate: 
(15,000-150,000 X) (.22) =3,300-33,000 X 
IX. Net After-Tax Interest Cost at the Reduced Rate of Interest: 
15,000-150,000 X-[3 ,300-33 ,000 Xl 
= 15 ,000-150 ,000 X-3 ,300+33 ,000 X 
= 11,700-117,000 X 
X. Present Value of Net After-Tax Interest Cost at Reduced Rate of 
Interest: 
Year 1-(.909) (11,700-117,000 X) = 
Year 2-(.826) (11,700-117,000 X) 
Year 3-(.751) (11,700-117,000 X) = 
Year 4-( . 683) (11,700-117,000 X) 
Year 5-(.621) (11,700-117,000 X) = 
Year 6-(.564) (11,700-117,000 X) = 
Year 7-(.513) (11,700-117,000 X) = 
Year 8-(.467) (11,700-117,000 X) = 
Year 9-(.424) (11,700-117,000 X) = 
Year 10-(.386) (11,700-117,000 X) = 
Year 11-(.350) (11,700-117,000 X) = 
Year 12-( .319) (11,700-117,000 X) 
Year 13-(.290) (11,700-117,000 X) = 
Year 14-(.263) (11,700-117,000 X) = 
Year 15-(.239) (11,700-117,000 X) = 
Total 
$10,635-106,350 X 
9,664- 96,640 X 
8,787- 87,870 X 
7,991- 79,910 X 
7 , 266- 72,660 X 
6,599- 65,990 X 
6,002- 60,020 X 
5,464- 54,640 X 
4,961- 49,610X 
4,516- 45,160 X 
4,095- 40,950 X 
3,732- 37,320 X 
3,393- 33,930 X 
3,077- 30,770 X 
2,796- 27,960 X 
$88,978-889,780 X 
XI. Section 169 Recast as a Reduction in Interest Cost: 
88,978- 889,780 X= 83,499 
-889,780X= -5,479 
X= -5,479 
-889,780 
X= .616% 
10%- .616%= 9.384% 
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